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Chlopak: Legislative Focus: Foreign Terrorist Military Tribunal Authorizat

legislative focus
Foreign Terrorist Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2001
by Erin Chlopak*

O

n December 12, 2001, Congresswoman Jane Harman (D-CA) introduced H.R. 3468, the Foreign
Terrorist Military Tribunal Authorization Act of
2001 (Act), which would authorize the president to convene military tribunals for trial outside the United States
of persons who are neither U.S. citizens nor lawful resident aliens, and who are apprehended in connection
with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the
United States. The Act, currently pending in House of
Representatives committees, would serve to codify the
authority assumed by President George W. Bush in his
Executive Order of November 13, 2001. The Executive
Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism (Executive Order), authorizes the trial of suspected terrorists by military commissions. The Act provides that military tribunals would be
convened only outside the United States, and preserves
broad executive authority to specify the location of the tribunals, the procedures to be employed, the suspects to be
tried, and the offenses with which they will be charged.
The Act requires that the president transmit to Congress
and to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court a
semi-annual report specifying such details, and further
provides that the report be unclassified “to the extent possible.” The Act also includes a sunset provision, terminating its authorization of military tribunals on December 31, 2005. Similar to President Bush’s Executive Order,
the Act pertains to individuals suspected of planning,
authorizing, committing, or aiding the September 11
attacks, as well as those suspected of harboring any organization or individual that planned, authorized, committed, or aided the attacks. The Act expressly preserves
the right to petition for habeas corpus, providing that
“[n]othing in any military order, executive order, regulation, or other directive of the executive branch may limit
the rights or privileges of any individual . . . relating to
habeas corpus.”
The legitimacy of trying suspected terrorists by military
tribunals has been debated fervently since President Bush’s
November decree. The Act, if passed, would partially rectify Bush’s apparent attempt to deny those convicted by a
military tribunal the privilege “to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding . . . in any court of the United States,”
by expressly prohibiting the executive branch from limiting the constitutional writ of habeas corpus. Nevertheless,
in limiting post-conviction remedies to habeas corpus, the
Act passively sustains the Executive Order’s denial of the
right to appeal a conviction by a military tribunal to an Article III court. The Act is also silent on a variety of other limitations embodied in the Executive Order concerning the
procedural rights of suspected terrorists.
The Executive Order defines suspected terrorists as
those whom the president determines “there is reason to
believe” are or were members of al Qaida; engaged in,
aided or abetted, or conspired to commit international

acts of terrorism; or knowingly harbored one or more individuals meeting such descriptions. The Act fails to define
the standard of suspicion necessary to detain and try suspected terrorists in military tribunals, passively supporting the “presidential determination of a ‘reason to
believe’” standard, which the Executive Order articulates. Such a standard falls outside the realm of the more
familiar “probable cause” and “reasonable suspicion”
benchmarks, and therefore lacks a basis for comparative
evaluation, rendering its reliability questionable.
Additionally, although the Act requires that the president report to Congress on the procedures used in any military tribunal convened, it is silent on the broad procedural
guidelines articulated in Bush’s Executive Order. Specifically, the Executive Order embraces all evidence “of probative value to a reasonable person,” including hearsay
and evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution; it provides for a
determination of guilt by a two-thirds vote, as opposed to
the unanimous verdict required in U.S. jury trials; and it
also provides for a two-thirds vote for sentencing, including capital sentences. Even military court martial proceedings require a three-fourths vote for a life sentence and
a unanimous vote to impose the death penalty.
The Act would passively sustain guidelines provided in
President Bush’s Executive Order for trying suspected terrorists in military tribunals although they fail to meet
international standards for criminal prosecutions. For
example, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the U.S. ratified in
1992, provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” Similarly, it asserts, “[n]o one
shall be deprived of his liberty except . . . in accordance
with such procedures as are established by law.” The
arrest and detention of individuals on the basis of President Bush’s personal determination that there is “reason
to believe” they are terrorists; that they planned, authorized, committed, or aided the September 11 attacks; or
that they harbored an organization or individual that so
planned, authorized, committed, or aided, may well be
arbitrary. Moreover, in diverging substantially from the
procedures established under U.S. federal and constitutional law, and even from those established under U.S. military law for courts martial, the procedures set forth in
Bush’s Executive Order violate the ICCPR.
In defense of military tribunals, President Bush has
asserted that those who would be tried in such courts are
“unlawful combatants who seek to destroy our country and
our way of life.” Indeed, unlawful combatants, in contrast
to prisoners of war, lack due process protections under
the Geneva Conventions, which govern the laws of war.
International treaties, such as the ICCPR, however, are not
specific to certain persons, but rather protect the fundamental human rights of all persons. Moreover, the clascontinued on page 36
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sification of detainees as unlawful combatants, and not prisoners of war, is a
legal determination governed by the
1977 Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1). In particular, Article 45 of Protocol 1 articulates a presumption that a person who partakes
in hostilities and falls into an adverse
party’s power is a prisoner of war, and
therefore protected by the Third
Geneva Convention “if he claims the
status of prisoner of war, or if he
appears to be entitled to such status, or
if the Party on which he depends
claims such status on his behalf . . . .”
Additionally, Protocol 1 provides that
where “any doubt arise[s] as to whether
any such person is entitled to the status of prisoner of war, he shall continue to have such status, and therefore, to be protected by the Third
[Geneva] Convention and this Protocol until such time as his status has
been determined by a competent tri-

bunal (emphasis added).” Thus, President Bush’s ad hoc decision that individuals, whose guilt he determines
should be adjudicated by a military
commission, are unlawful combatants
is improper. An executive determination that detainees are unlawful combatants, rather than prisoners of war,
may in some instances violate the guarantee of a judicial determination of
such status codified in Protocol 1, and
in graver instances, this executive determination could violate humanitarian
protections guaranteed to prisoners
of war by the Geneva Conventions.
Importantly, trial by a military commission of persons wrongfully denied
prisoner of war status would violate
Article 106 of the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949,
which provides that all prisoners of
war have the right of appeal or petition
from any sentence, in the same manner as members of the armed forces of
the detaining power.
Prosecuting and punishing perpetrators of the September 11 attacks on
the United States is undoubtedly an

important and formidable task. Sacrificing fundamental due process guarantees recognized under federal and
international law, however, carries
heavy consequences. Congressional
authorization of military tribunals
would constitute a great hypocrisy in
light of U.S. criticism of military tribunals throughout the world, particularly those in Peru, where the U.S.
Department of State criticized a military trial of an American accused of
terrorism, demanding that the trial be
held “in open civilian court with full
rights of legal defense, in accordance
with international judicial norms.” In
light of these potential legal and political consequences, it is critical that
Congress take additional steps to regulate the procedures employed in military tribunals, and ensure that the
U.S. effort to protect itself from terrorism does not result in seriously
undermining U.S. credibility throughout the world. 
* Erin Chlopak is a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law and a staff
writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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